ABSTRACT
Late in 2020, two genetically-distinct clusters of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) with mutations of biological concern were reported, one in the United Kingdom and one in South Africa. Using a combination of data from routine surveillance, genomic sequencing and international travel we track the international dispersal of lineages B.1.1.7 and B.1.351 (variant 501Y-V2). We account for potential biases in genomic surveillance efforts by including passenger volumes from location of where the lineage was first reported, London and South Africa respectively. Using the software tool grinch (global report investigating novel coronavirus haplotypes), we track the international spread of lineages of concern with automated daily reports, Further, we have built a custom tracking website (cov-lineages.org/global_report.html) which hosts this daily report and will continue to include novel SARS-CoV-2 lineages of concern as they are detected.
ABSTRACT
AIM: To investigate the sources of infection among healthcare workers (HCWs) and patients in a teaching hospital in the Netherlands during the early stages of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic using epidemiological and whole-genome sequencing data. METHODS: From 3rd April to 11th May 2020, 88 HCWs and 215 patients were diagnosed with COVID-19. Whole-genome sequences were obtained for 30 HCWs and 20 patients. RESULTS: Seven and 11 sequence types were identified in HCWs and patients, respectively. Cluster A was the most common sequence type, detected in 23 (77%) HCWs; of these, 14 (61%) had direct patient contact and nine (39%) had indirect patient contact. In addition, seven patients who were not hospitalized in the COVID-19 cohort isolation ward who became positive during their admission were infected with severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) cluster A. Following universal masking of all HCWs and emphasis on physical distancing during meals and breaks, no further evidence was found for patient-to-HCW or HCW-to-HCW transmission or vice versa. CONCLUSION: The finding that patients and HCWs were infected with SARS-CoV-2 cluster A suggests both HCW-to-HCW and HCW-to-patient transmission.
Subject(s)
COVID-19/transmission , Health Personnel/statistics & numerical data , Hospitals, Teaching/statistics & numerical data , Infectious Disease Transmission, Patient-to-Professional/statistics & numerical data , Inpatients/statistics & numerical data , SARS-CoV-2/genetics , SARS-CoV-2/isolation & purification , Adult , Aged , Aged, 80 and over , COVID-19/epidemiology , Cohort Studies , Female , Humans , Male , Middle Aged , Netherlands/epidemiology , Pandemics/statistics & numerical dataABSTRACT
Objectives: The emergence of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) in 2012 was accompanied by uncertainty about its epidemiological and clinical characteristics. Once camelus dromedarius was found to be the natural reservoir of the virus public health systems across the Arabian Peninsula came under unprecedented pressure to control its transmission. This study describes how a One Health approach was used in Qatar to manage the MERS-CoV outbreak between 2012 and 2017. Method(s): The One Health approach adopted brought together professionals working in the health, animal welfare, and environmental sectors. To manage the MERS outbreak the Qatar National Outbreak Control Taskforce (OCT) was reactivated in November 2012 and experts from the animal health sector were invited to join. Later, technical expertise was requested from the WHO, FAO, CDC, Erasmus University (EMC), and Public Health England (PHE). A One Health roadmap was subsequently delivered addressing surveillance and investigation, epidemiological studies and increased local diagnostic capacity. Result(s): The joint OCT, once trained, was allocated resources and had access to high risk areas to gather evidence on the potential source of the virus and investigate all cases within 24-48 hours of reporting. Lack of sufficient technical guidance on veterinary surveillance and poor risk perception among vulnerable populations constituted major obstacles to maintaining systematic One Health performance. Conclusion(s): A One Health approach is essential for generating evidence and implementing control measures to restrain MERS-CoV and other zoonotic diseases.